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I. I n t r o d u c t io n
LAWYERS seldom have the luxury of speaking in generalities. The particulars of the cases and the client’s problems we deal 
with usually limit our immediate concerns and thinking to the facts 
at hand. Facts, unlike the generalities law professors are allowed to 
dispense in the classroom or the unreal assumptions economists are 
sometimes allowed to ignore in constructing or applying abstract 
models, simply refuse to be put down. Because I count myself a 
lawyer first, at least when in the company of other lawyers, I wel­
come the opportunity to escape the limitations of particular facts 
and to speak at this Institute in generalities, namely some generali­
ties about the current wave of monopolization litigation. Our hosts 
have indeed been generous not only by asking me to talk about the 
general features unique to current monopolization litigation, but by 
also asking me to be controversial because most of us are probably 
drowsy after consuming too much at lunch. How often does a lawyer 
have an invitation to be somewhat irresponsible in public, as well? 
The opportunity is even more inviting in light of the general confu­
sion and shifts in doctrine which appear to be taking place in cur­
rent monopolization litigation. It puts in one’s mind the story about 
the stranger driving through a small town who noticed several fel­
lows struggling to hold a long pole upright while one of their number 
gamely tried to climb the wavering pole. The stranger stopped and 
asked, “What are you fellows trying to do?” They responded, “We 
are trying to measure the pole.” The stranger said, “Why not put it 
down and measure it on the ground?” They responded, “We do not 
want to know how long it is; we want to find out how tall it is.” We 
all know how long current monopolization litigation is; permit me to 
suggest some general impressions about features of current section 2 
litigation affecting how tall it may be.
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II. S o m e  G e n e r a l  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  C u r r e n t  M o n o p o l i z a t i o n
L it ig a t io n
Several general features of recent monopolization litigation, the 
“third wave”1 if you will, are now quite apparent. They include the 
following. First, there is a significant and increased reliance upon 
economic analysis (particularly the brand espoused by the neo-class­
ical ideologists) to decide specific cases and the limit the facts rele­
vant to the decision of specific cases to those facts the economic 
model of the neo-classical religion defines as relevant.2 Second, most 
of the current monopolization litigation is private treble damage liti­
gation, as opposed to the bulk of the monopolization litigation in 
earlier “waves” being government-initiated litigation.3 Third, rele­
vant market analysis is becoming even more of a major battleground 
in many current monopolization cases, with a marked tendency to 
litigate the question endlessly and decide market definitions 
mechanically rather than functionally in light of the goals of the 
statute.4 Fourth, the issue of what evidence in addition to the pos­
session of monopoly power in a relevant market is necessary to 
prove unlawful monopolization — the conduct issue — has become 
even more central in most of the current cases than in past cases 
and even more confused than in the inscrutable opinions of Wave 
II cases.6 Fifth, the procedural and discovery morass of the “big
1. Flynn, M onopolization  U nder th e Sherm an Act: The Third W ave and B e­
yond, 26 A n t i t r u s t  B u l l .  1 (1981).
2. See Flynn, The M isuse of Economic Analysis in A n titru st L itigation , 12 Sw. 
U. L. R ev. 335 (1981).
3. See Flynn, Supra  note 1, at 1-2, 22.
4. See generally  Symposium, M arket D efinition in M erger and M onopolization  
Cases: Concepts and Techniques, 49 A n t i t r u s t  L. J. 1143 (1980); Ames, E viden tiary  
A spects of R elevant Product M arket Proof in M onopolization Cases, 26 D e P a u l  L. 
R ev. 530 (1977); Stein & Brett, M arket D efinitions and M arket Power in A n titru st 
Cases — An E m pirical Prim er on When, W hy- and How, 24 N.Y.L.S. R ev. 639 
(1979); Comment, R elevant Geographic M arket D elineation: The In terchangeability  
of S tandards in Cases Arising U nder Section  2  of the Sherm an A ct and Section  7 of 
the C layton A ct, 1979 D u k e  L. J. 1152; Note, The Role of S u p p ly  S u b stitu ta b ility  in 
Defining the R elevan t M arket, 65 V a. L . R ev , 129 (1979); Glassman, M arket Defini­
tion as a Practical M atter, 49 A n t i t r u s t  L. J. 1155 (1980); Schmallensee, On the Use 
of Economic M odels in A n titru st: The ReaLem on Case, 127 U. P a . L. R ev . 994 
(1979).
5. See generally  Blecher & Woodhead, Bigness and Badness: A Review of the  
Requirem ent of “D elibera teness" in M onopolization, 10 Sw. U. L. R ev. 117 (1978); 
Shepherd, A n atom y of a M onopoly: Costs, Prices, and Innovation, 12 A n t i t r u s t  L . 
& E co n . R ev . 93 (1980); Lane, The Conduct S tan dard  for Legally Acquired M onopo-
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case”6 has become so overwhelming that there should be a general 
concern in a profession dedicated to the “rule of law” with whether 
or not a government or private section 2 case attacking significant 
monopoly power can any longer be considered a reasonable course of 
action to regulate undue economic power in our society.7 Finally, 
there has been a marked increase in political intervention in the liti­
gation of significant monopolization cases through appeals to Con­
gress or the White House which may be undermining the integrity 
of judicial implementation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.8 With 
targets like these, how can one avoid being controversial? Permit me 
to explore the practical consequences of these features of current 
monopolization litigation more fully.
A. Reliance on Economic Models
Earlier monopolization litigation was carried on in the grand tra­
dition of the common law process; social and political concerns, the 
legislative history of section 2, a dash of economic insights, and ap­
peals to morality, fairness, equity, common sense, and the values 
and intuition of the judge all openly entered the calculus of whether 
it was appropriate to conclude that a defendant had violated the law 
under the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Economic 
theory was given its due, but only in a vague and general way, to 
support conclusions derived from some other basis and not as the 
sole determinant of the path of analysis. Judge Hand’s opinion in
ties U nder Section  2  of the Sherm an A ct, 49 U. C inn . L . R ev . 206 (1980); Comment, 
Draining the  Alcoa “W ishing W ell”: The Section  2 Conduct R equirem ent A fter  Ko­
dak and  CalComp, 48 F o r d .  L. R ev. 291 (1980); Comment, Sherm an A n titru st A ct: 
What is W ilful A cquisition  or M ain tenance of M onopoly Power?, 23 T r i a l  L aw . 
G u ide  563 (1980).
6. For a summary of the procedural difficulties of the private antitrust suit 
against IBM by Control Data Corporation, see 786 A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  R eg . R ep. 
(BNA) AA-10, AA-16 (Oct. 26,1976); In re Exxon Corp., No. 8934, 3 T r a d e  R eg . R ep. 
(CCH) H 21,866 (F.T.C. 1981). See also United States v. AT&T, 1031 A n t i t r u s t  & 
T r a d e  R eg . R ep. (BNA) H -l (Sept. 17, 1981).
7. See 1 R e p o r t ,  N a t i o n a l  C om m ission  f o r  t h e  R eview  o f  A n t i t r u s t  L aw s a n d  
P r o c e d u r e s  1-11 (1979).
8. Antitrust policy at bottom is a matter of political value judgment, both as to 
how the economy does in fact work and the role of government in determining how 
the economy should work. The kind of political intervention unique to current litiga­
tion is the marked increase of extra-judicial intervention in filed cases through Con­
gress and by the Executive branch, only an occasional feature of past periods of anti­
trust enforcement.
HeinOnline -- 13 U. T o l . L. Rev. 501 1981-1982
502 TOLEDO LAW  REVIEW [Vol. 13
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America9 set the tone, painting 
with the broad brush of the common law process — weighing in­
sights from several sources and blending the recipe with an underly­
ing common sense and a feel for the broad purposes of the law. 
Cases like United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co, (Cello­
phane),10 from the same era relying on the economic concept of 
cross-elasticity of demand as the sole test for product market defini­
tions, were soon recognized as aberrations by merger cases like 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.11 Brown Shoe relegated cross­
elasticity to the status of only one of several tests for defining the 
broad outer boundaries of a market. By no means was cross-elastic­
ity to be the final word for defining relevant markets or the premise 
for why it was held in a particular case that the law was or was not 
violated, whatever “markets” were deemed relevant.12
In third wave monopolization litigation, on the other hand, many 
courts are turning with increasing frequency to one form of eco­
nomic analysis for determining the objectives of the law,18 the defi­
nitions of markets,14 the existence or nonexistence of monopoly
9. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
10. 351 U.S. 377 (1956). See supra  note 1 at 9, 17-21, 25.
11. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See Flynn, supra  note 1 at 20, 24-5 (criticizing the prac­
tice of interchanging market tests developed in merger cases with monopolization 
cases and vice-versa).
12. See su pra  n o te  4. F o r critic ism  o f th e  du Pont op in io n , see L. S u l l iv a n ,  A n ­
t i t r u s t  53-58 (1977); M arcus, A n titru st Bugbears: S u b stitu te  P rodu cts—Oligopoly, 
105 U. P a . L. R ev . 185 (1956); S to ck in g  & M uelle r, The C ellophane Case and the  
N ew  C om petition , 45 Am. E co n , R ev. 29 (1955); T u rn e r ,  A n titru st Policy and the  
C ellophane Case, 70 H a rv . L. R ev. 281 (1956). See also U n ite d  S ta te s  v. A T & T , 1031 
A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  R eg . R ep . (B N A ) H -l a t  H-20 (S e p t. 17, 1981) (“ W hile  c ro ss­
e la s t ic ity  o f  d e m a n d  is ce rta in ly  th e  m o st im p o r ta n t d e te rm in a n t o f  m a rk e t  d e fin itio n  
u n d e r  th e  a n t i t r u s t  laws, i t  is w ell-estab lish ed  th a t  u n d e r  c e r ta in  c irc u m sta n ce s  m a r­
k e ts  m a y  be ag g re g a te d  on a  b as is  o th e r  th a n  econom ic s u b s t i tu ta b il i ty .” )- But see  
A u b u rn  N ew s Co. v. P ro v id en ce  J o u rn a l  Co., 504 F. S u p p . 292 (D . R .I. 1980) (ex is­
te n c e  o f  m o n o p o ly  pow er cou ld  be in fe rred  from  low cro ss-e las tic ity  b e tw e en  th e  p u b ­
lis h e r ’s  p a p e rs  a n d  th e  d e m an d  fo r su b u rb a n  d ailies a n d  from  a n  overw helm ing  m a r ­
k e t  sh a re  — 90% fo r n ew sp ap ers  o f  genera l c ircu la tio n  to  65% fo r a ll da ilie s  in  th e  
s ta te ) .
13. A not unsurprising result given the vagueness of precedent from earlier sec­
tion 2 cases, the vigor with which proponents of neo-classical theology have spread 
the word, and the availability of an all-expenses-paid trip for judges to hear the word 
in comfortable surroundings. See  Barbash, Big Corporations Bankroll Sem inars for 
U.S. Judges, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 1980 at A-l, col. 3.
14. See  cases cited infra note 26; Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, 
Inc., 575 F.2d 256 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1978); Flynn, supra  note 1 at 
24-32.
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power18 and the evaluation of conduct claimed by plaintiffs as mo­
nopolistic and claimed by defendants as pro-competitive.16 Increas­
ing reliance has been placed on neoclassical economic analysis as a 
surefooted way to decide cases.17 The model, with its unreal assump­
tions, extensive and abstract sub-rules and complex artificial predic­
tions, is made the major premise of analysis and only those facts of 
the case fitting the assumptions of the model are allowed to make 
up the minor premise of a syllogism. The rules of the model are ap­
plied to some of the facts of the case to achieve the “right’ result. 
Elsewhere, I have called the adoption of this form of reasoning the 
advent of the “gumball dispenser system” of legal decision-making:18 
one needs only to set up a model, plug in some factual sounding 
assumptions, pull the lever of deductive logic and out pops the right 
answer. Common sense, judicial intuition, facts of the case inconsis­
tent with the assumptions of the model, the insights of different 
schools of economic thought, and the broader purposes of the law 
are all ignored or, at least, it is pretended they are ignored. Instead 
of the valuable insights of the model and their value being a place to 
begin analysis of the facts in dispute and of some weight in the final 
judgment, the insights become a straightjacket dictating what facts 
are relevant, what values may be weighed and what conclusions are 
permitted. It is indeed a strange form of reasoning,19 one whose 
claim of an empirical basis ranks with similar claims made for
15. Shepherd, A natom y of a M onopoly (II): The Power to  Control Prices, 12 
A n t i t r u s t  L. & E co n . R ev. 73 (1980); Green, A n Economic Analysis of M onopoly  
and A n ti-com petitive  Power, 10 Sw. U. L. Rev. 65 (1978). See  Weber v. Wynne, 431 
F.Supp. 1048 (D. N.J. 1977).
16. See  Flynn, supra  note 1 at 32. See also  Cowley v. Braden Indus., Inc., 613 
F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980); Eliason Corp. v. National Sani­
tation Found., 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.), cert, den ied, 101 S.Ct. 89 (1980); Brown v. 
Hansen Publications, 556 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1977) (exclusive dealing contracts may be 
procompetitive in purpose); Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 1981-2 Trade 
Cas (CCH) U 64,249 (3d Cir. 1981) (exclusive licensing contracts did not constitute 
monopolization because the parties had no power to exclude competition); Richter 
Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) If 63,947 
(S.D. Ohio 1981); Cooney v. American Horse Shows Ass’n, 495 F.Supp. 424 (S.D. N.Y. 
1980) (rules and regulations of horse show association promoted rather than re­
strained competition).
17. Flynn, supra  note 2.
18. See generally  Flynn, Further Aside: A C om m ent on "The Common Law Ori­
gins of the Infield F ly R ule,1' 4 J. C on tem p . L. 241, 242 (1978); see  Flynn, supra  note
1 at 30.
19. See Wiles, Ideology, M ethodology, an d  N eoclassical Economics, 2 J. P o s t  
K e y n e s ia n  E co n . 155, 160-61 (1979).
HeinOnline -- 13 U. T o l . L. Rev. 503 1981-1982
504 TOLEDO LAW  REVIEW [Vol. 13
“Ouija boards.”
The unreal abstractions of the model and the mechanical use of 
deductive reasoning in its application are implicitly present in many 
monopolization cases, but are used more explicitly in other areas of 
antitrust litigation. For example, most of the reality of vertical mar­
ket restraints is now shrouded in myths generated out of potentially 
worthwhile insights from the neoclassical model. “Free riders” are 
seen under every rock or are assumed to be a potential evil justify­
ing every restraint. The ill-defined concept of “free rider” is appar­
ently attached to buyers not abiding by any goal a seller seeks to 
achieve by a vertical restraint. The theology condemns “free riders” 
as a plague and their rights and “rationality” as beyond notice by 
the law. Exclusive weight is given to assumptions about the rational­
ity of sellers but not the rationality of buyers entangled in a vertical 
restraint. Time and power are ignored in the analysis, along with 
market imperfections and countervailing social and political values 
inevitably involved in assessing facts unique to the dispute. Unjusti­
fied vertical restraints can only be explained by the assumption that 
there must be horizontal collusion lurking in the vicinity. The possi­
bility that those imposing the restraints are acting in ways contrary 
to the assumptions of the model, or that the law ought to be con­
cerned with goals and values not allowed by the model, are possibili­
ties the theology cannot tolerate lest the entire edifice will crumble. 
The long discredited process of decision-making by hypotheticals 
and ruminations about what would happen in the unreal world of 
the model20 are substituted for the complex, empirical and realistic 
analysis by the legal process of the facts and circumstances unique 
to the case.
If the views reported here today from the Antitrust Division*1 are 
followed by the courts, we will not only be afflicted by the religion of 
“monetarism” in our monetary affairs and the simplemindedness of 
“supply side” economics in our fiscal affairs, but also by the misuse 
of one brand of economic theology to dictate results in particular 
cases involving vertical market restraints. It is our common misfor­
tune that the affairs of the world, particularly those of such signifi­
cance that they provoke litigation, are far more complex than is as­
sumed by the proponents of a simple magic potion to resolve all our 
economic ills. For the purveyors of such magical tonics, the practical
20. Cf., Thode, The Indefensible Use of the H ypoth etica l Case to D eterm ine  
Cause in Fact, 46 T e x . L. Rev. 423 (1968).
21. See Carr, Some Reflections on V ertical R estrain ts, 13 U. T o l .  L. R ev. 587 
(1982).
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affairs of the real world and the resolution of specific cases are both 
understood and decided by the narrow assumptions and predictions 
of a world that does not exist. The consequences of this line of 
thinking can easily be seen. In vertical restraint cases, for example, 
we have gravitated to the knee-jerk application of the inflexible dic­
tates of an ideology out of touch with reality and the goals of the 
law24 from the knee-jerk application of the inflexible common law 
rule against “restraints on alienation” designed to control medieval 
land transactions,23 in circumstances where each approach has un­
derlying policy considerations to contribute but neither should be 
allowed to dictate the ultimate outcome of a specific case.24
It would seem that past experiences with legal positivism should 
have taught us the risks of permitting abstract rules detached from 
their factual and moral assumptions and the circumstances of their 
birth to be deductively applied to the shifting and changing affairs 
of the real world. The possibility that there may be or ought to be 
justifications for imposing vertical market restraints in some circum­
stances should not be permitted to seduce one to believe the re­
straints are justified in all cases or even most of them.25 While the 
security of a fixed set of beliefs and an unreal model of reality may 
be necessary to allay fears common to the insecure who enlist in 
causes like the “moral majority,” a legal process devoted to the prin­
22. See  Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
23. See  United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
24. See  Flynn, The Function and D ysfunction of Per Se Rules in V ertical M ar­
ket R estra in ts, 58 W ash . U. L. Q. 767 (1980).
25. Id. If, of course, one ignores the history of the statute, precedent, and the 
functions of law in our society and defines the criteria for weighing the merits of 
specific decisions in terms of whether judicial intervention would “increase consumer 
welfare through a judicial decree,” R . B o rk ,  T h e  A n t i t r u s t  P a r a d o x  61 (1978), trial 
of the effect of the defendant’s behavior upon the maintenance of a competitive pro­
cess for the benefit of one and all becomes a trial of the court’s conduct. The statute 
has not been amended to ban every judicial decree interfering with “consumer wel­
fare.” Nor is “consumer welfare” a necessary byproduct of vertical or other restraints 
taking place in circumstances not in accord with the assumptions of the model. See  
DeLong, The Role, I f  A ny, O f Economic Analysis In A n titru s t L itigation , 12 Sw. U. 
L. R ev. 298, 324 (1981). The concept of “consumer welfare,” an abstraction with 
meaning in the context of the model like that for the meaning of a “trick” in the 
game of bridge, does have the advantage of sounding like a worthwhile and identifi­
able goal. It becomes relatively formless and mushy, however, when translated into 
the affairs of the real world. At best, it is the expression of a moral value entitled to 
the same weight as other values in the adjudication of specific disputes. At worst, it is 
a slogan, not unlike other political slogans of the recent times which confuses rather 
than clarifies the complex task of antitrust litigation.
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cipled but pragmatic resolution of disputes in the real world cannot 
permit its objectives and methodology to be replaced by a model 
detached from reality and a methodology at odds with that of the 
common law process. The principled and pragmatic resolution of 
specific cases involving vertical market restraints, if current Anti­
trust Division theology is followed, will result in the useless exercise 
of the litigation of all cases confirming the self-fulfilling prophecies 
of the model, rather than dealing realistically, constructively, and 
justly with the reality of specific cases in light of the complex goals 
of the law.
The most pronounced current use of this kind of economic mod­
eling to dictate results mechanically in monopolization cases from 
the real world is, of course, reliance upon marginal or average cost 
pricing theory to measure whether a monopolist has engaged in 
predatory pricing.26 It is a topic I will defer for later discussion by 
other speakers except to note that some courts27 have begun to real­
ize the Areeda-Turner test28 is a “defendant’s paradise,”29 impracti­
cal to administer in most circumstances, and a concept of pricing 
peculiar to one form of abstract and theoretical economic theorizing,
26. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d 
917 (9th Cir. 1981); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 
427 (7th Cir. 1980); Northeastern Tel. Co. v, American Tel. & Tel. Co., 1981-1 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) H 64,027 (2d Cir. 1981).
27. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F.Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
28. Areeda & Turner, P reda tory Pricing and R elated Practices U nder Section  2  
of the Sherm an A ct, 88 H a rv , L. R ev. 697 (1975).
29. T ra n sa m e r ic a  C o m p u te r  Co. v. IB M  C orp., 481 F .S u p p . 965, 994-95. T h e  
A re e d a -T u rn e r  p o s itio n  h a s  p ro v o k ed  m a n y  responses, am ong  th e m  th e  following: 
S ch ere r, P redatory Pricing and the Sherm an Act: A Comment, 89 H arv. L. R ev . 869 
(1976); A reed a  & T u rn e r ,  Scherer on P redatory Pricing: A R eply, 89 H arv. L . R ev . 
891 (1976); S ch e re r, Som e L ast W ords on P redatory Pricing, 89 H arv. L, R ev. 901 
(1976); W illiam so n , P reda tory  Pricing: A S trategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Y ale L. 
J .  284 (1977); A re ed a  & T u rn e r , W illiam son on Predatory Pricing, 87 Y ale L . J .  1337
(1978); W illiam son , A P relim inary Response, 87 Y a le  L. J .  1353 (1978); W illiam son , 
W illiam son on P reda tory Pricing II, 88 Y a le  L.J. 1183 (1979); A reed a  & T u rn e r, 
P redatory Pricing: A Rejoinder, 88 Y a le  L.J. 1641 (1979); G reer, A C ritique of 
A reeda-T urner’s S tan dard  for P redatory Practices, 24 A n t i t r u s t  B u l l .  233 (1979); 
A reeda , P reda tory Pricing, 49 A n t i t r u s t  L. J ,  897 (1980); M cG ee, P reda tory Pricing  
R evisited , 23 J. L. & E c o n . 289 (1980); N o te , Apraisal of M arginal Cost and P reda­
to ry  Pricing U nder Section  2 of the Sherm an Act, 30 A la . L. R ev. 562 (1979). F o r 
ex ce llen t su m m arie s  o f th e  d e b a te  a n d  suggested  a lte rn a tiv e  s ta n d a rd s , see B rod ley  & 
H ay, P reda tory Pricing: Com peting Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal 
S tandards, 66 C o r n e l l  L. R ev. 738 (1981); Joskow  & K levorick , A Framework for 
A nalyzing P reda tory  Pricing Policy, 89 Y a le  L. J . 213 (1979); F ed . T r a d e  Comm., 
S t r a t e g y ,  P r e d a t i o n  a n d  A n t i t r u s t  A n a ly s is  (1981).
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but not followed by most businesses in the unhappy reality of the 
real world where business is done and lawsuits are decided. A sine 
quo non for “predatory pricing” it is not, although precisely what 
alternative standard is generally appropriate and legally permissible 
in particular circumstances is not altogether clear. The Ninth Cir­
cuit has now traveled halfway around the circle, from California 
Computer Products, Inc. u. IB M  Corp.30 and similar cases31 applying 
a marginal cost standard rigidly as the test for predatory pricing, to 
cases such as W. Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. IT T  Continental Bak­
ing Co., Inc.32 recognizing pricing below “average total cost” as le­
gally suspect in light of other factors in the case. Several other 
cases33 have encountered the further problem of the practical diffi­
culties with proving a defendant’s pricing fell above or below the 
imiginary line of either marginal cost or full cost, in light of the fact 
that most businesses do not price products in neat conformity with 
the assumptions of the model or do not keep their books in a way 
that makes a reasoned guess defensible.34 Whichever test one fol­
lows,35 the complexity of proving predatory pricing will probably de­
ter pricing behavior monopolization suits by plaintiffs in all but 
clear-cut cases of below cost selling or instances of pricing tactics 
aimed at the plaintiff and accompanied by conduct which is other­
wise predatory.
Economic theorizing — the gumball variety — creeps in else­
where in the analysis of contemporary monopolization cases. This is
30. 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
31. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F.Supp. 423 (N.D. 
Cal. 1978).
32. 652 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1981).
33. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. 
Cal. 1979) (prices below average cost should be considered illegal if they are unrea­
sonable); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th 
Cir. 1980).
34. Joskow & Klevorik, A Framework for A nalyzing P redatory Pricing Policy, 
89 Y a le  L. J. 213 (1979); for an analysis of the empirical data, see Harris & Sullivan, 
Passing On the M onopoly Overcharge: A Com prehensive A nalysis, 128 U. P a . L. 
R ev. 269, 303-309 (1979). For a more general analysis of the questionable nature of 
the rationality assumption, see M . H o l l i s  & E . N e l l ,  R a t io n a l  E conom ic  M a n  
(1975); Heilbroner, Book Review, 27 N .Y . R ev. o f  B o o k s , Feb. 21, 1980 at 19 (review­
ing A. E ic h n e r ,  A G u id e  T o  P o s t  K e y n e s ia n  E co n o m ics (1980)).
35. For a comparison of the diverse tests for predatory pricing, see generally 
Brodley & Hay, P redatory Pricing: C om peting Economic Theories and the E volution  
of Legal S tandards, 66 C o r n e l l  L. R ev. 738 (1981); Baumol, Quasi-Perm anence of 
Price Reductions: A Policy for P revention  of P redatory Pricing, 89 Y a le  L. J. 1
(1979); Roller, When is Pricing P red a to ry?, 24 A n t i t r u s t  B u l l .  283 (1979).
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particularly the case with market definitions, where cross-elasticity 
of supply and demand remain significant factors in defining mar­
kets, along with a myriad of practical factors influencing the deci­
sion from case to case.36 Market definitions have become a central 
issue in many third wave cases, a not surprising development, be­
cause a narrow “submarket” can magnify the defendant’s market 
share,37 while a broad market definition can diminish both a defen­
dant’s market share and the likelihood of a resulting inference of 
monopoly power.38 This reality has not escaped lawyers grappling 
with winning their case and the battle over market definition has 
become, in many lawsuits, the end of the case rather than only a 
potential beginning of a case. Recent cases have included protracted 
battles over whether the power to grant franchises at Thistledown 
Racetrack is a separate market from the concession market gener­
ally,39 whether wholesaling orthodontic face bows is a market sepa­
rate from the retail sale of orthodontic face bows generally,40 and 
whether reprocessed lemon juice is a market separate from the juice 
of fresh lemons.41 Defining a market is usually dressed up in refer­
ences to economic tests like cross-elasticity, the strange concept of 
“submarkets,” consumer recognition of a way of selling a product as 
a separate market, and product substitutability.42 Economic tests
36. See supra  notes 10-12.
37. Submarkets were invoked by the Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294 (1956). See Flynn, supra  note 1 at 24-26. See also  United States v. 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (narrow market definition); Photovest Corp. v. 
Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) (drive- 
thru photographic processing stores as a relevant submarket).
38. General Business Sys. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH)
11 63,607 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (narrow product definition rejected); Malcolm v. Marathon
Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1981) (failure to establish relevant product and geo­
graphic markets fatal to gasoline dealer’s monopolization charge against a gasoline 
franchisor).
39. Raceway Properties, Inc. v. Emprise Corp., 613 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1980).
40. Eastern Dental Corp. v. Isaac Masel Co., Inc., 502 F.Supp. 1354 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
41. Borden, Inc., [1976-79 Transfer Binder], T r a d e  R e g . R ep. (CCH) K 21,490 
(F.T.C. 1978). See Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic M odels in A ntitrust: The  
ReaLem on Case, 127 U. Pa. L. R ev. 994 (1979).
42. See L. S u l l iv a n ,  A n t i t r u s t ,  74-93 (1977); Stein & Brett, supra  note 4, at 
669-75; Areeda & Turner, A n titru st Law , 321-45 (1978). See also  Nifty Foods Corp. 
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. E.I. du­
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 at 404 (product interchangeability); Pacific 
Mailing Equip. Corp. v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 499 F.Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (prod­
uct market: new vs old machines); Reid Brothers Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co.,
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are used in many cases to justify a result a party desperately seeks 
for his client, rather than to supply illumination to the court and a 
reasoned precedent from cases in the past in light of the complex 
goals of the law.
An observer from another planet would likely view the exercise 
as some sort of expensive, time-consuming, religious exercise — 
meaningful only to true believers in the primitive tribe practicing 
the ritual. Despite nearly uniform theoretical recognition that mar­
ket definitions are only a beginning of the analysis, and a fiction to 
boot (unless you really believe there is a physical thing out there in 
time and space called a market), lawyers and courts strain long and 
hard over market definitions. In the Borden, Inc. (ReaLemon)43 case 
the FTC went through many of these exercises, but finally settled on 
Borden's profit rate to justify inferring processed lemon juice is a 
separate market for antitrust purposes. A consistent profit rate of 
16.9% to 35.2% is certainly a basis for drawing an inference that the 
arena of the business in which the defendant operates is probably 
less than competitive, regardless of how one manipulates other eco­
nomic tests for defining markets.
The entire exercise should be placed in a broader perspective, 
because market tests are only one potential starting place for an 
analysis of the subtle and complex question of whether monopoly 
power has displaced the competitive process in a particular case and 
in ways which “ought” to be declared unlawful. If the theology of 
the neoclassical model were strictly followed, any demonstration of 
power over a “market” would be inconsistent with a model of pure 
competition. In such a model, consumers have all the power and 
firms have none.44 The law, of course, has long recognized that it is 
unrealistic to follow that standard for identifying monopoly power. 
By the same token, excessive reliance upon market definitions as the 
path to certainty in identifying monopoly power is also misleading. 
In some cases, market tests should be dispensed with because the 
presence or absence of monopoly power (in the sense of power to fix 
prices or exclude competitors) is readily apparent to all but the con­
testants.46 The litigation can get out of focus because too much em­
1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) H 64,228 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (variety of product markets in 
lumber business: sale of land; logging; milling; processing; sale of lumber).
43. See supra  note 41.
44. See  Thompson, C om petition  as a S trategic Process, 25 A n t i t r u s t  B u l l .  777
(1980).
45. Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. ALCOA, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert, denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306
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phasis is placed on an element which is not the central concern of 
the case, but only one potential means to the end of identifying the 
possession of the power or its exercise. Like high priests of a relig­
ion, however, we all go through the exercise of identifying markets, 
“measuring” power (quantitatively) and searching for smoking-gun 
conduct evidence because our formula for proof of a violation tells 
use we must do so, and do so to inordinate lengths. As an observer 
of the passing scene, I must confess that the game of market defini­
tion often appears to be played out to its fullest for reasons other 
than sensibly deciding what is the appropriate realm in which to 
decide whether or not a defendant’s conduct or structure ought to 
be found in violation of the policies and goals of the law. Winning 
by exhaustion and obfuscation rather than just winning by intimida­
tion or on the merits all too often appears to be the real objective of 
the combatants in litigating market definitions to the death.46
The numbers game continues to be played with market shares — 
over 70%, presumptively monopoly power; 50% to 70%, maybe; 
and, below 50%, no. For example, the court in the Platt Saco Lowell 
Ltd. v. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr47 case held that a fifty percent 
or below market share was conclusive evidence of a lack of monopoly 
power, while the Second Circuit has held erroneous a lower court 
instruction that a fifty percent or less market share was insufficient 
to show unlawful monopolization.48 A particular market share is not 
conclusive of the question of whether a firm possesses monopoly 
power, because a firm with a small market share (however manipu­
lated or defined) may still possess the power to fix prices or exclude 
competition.49 The statistical game of percentage shares can cause
F.Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969).
46. See  Nifty Food9 Corp. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.
1980) (seven years of discovery).
47. 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) H 61,898 (N.D. Ill, 1978).
48. Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) H 
64,068 (2d Cir. 1981).
49. Filmdex Chex Sys. v. Telecheck Washington, Inc., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
H 62,976 (D. D.C. 1979) (more than mere possession of a monopoly share of a market 
has to be shown; defendants must have had the ability to control prices or exclude 
competition); Van Dyk Research Corp. v Xerox Corp., 478 F.Supp. 1268 (D. N.J.
1979), aff'g 631 F.2d 251 (3d Cir. 1980), cert, den ied , 101 S. Ct. 3029 (1981). (Xerox’s 
35% market share did not give it the power to control prices or exclude competition); 
FDI, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas (CCH) K 63,823 (C.D. Cal.
1980) (first firm in market, with 100% market share; no showing defendant had a 
right or power to exclude competition or control prices).
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one to overlook the fact that, as in DuPont (Cellophane),50 a firm 
earning a sixty percent rate of return with a thirty percent share of 
whatever “market” or “submarket” one defines probably has the 
power (like the proverbial gorilla) to do whatever it wishes to do. 
The game of finding some magical percentage share of the market is 
traceable to Judge Hand’s offhand comment in Alcoa that ninety 
percent of a market is a monopoly, sixty-six percent may be and 
thirty-three percent is not.61 It is dicta which has become hardened 
into inflexible tests for legality and illegality and dicta which has 
contributed grealty to the efforts to gerrymander market tests to 
magnify or diminish market share percentages in just about every 
case which comes along.52 The time has come to discard this much 
abused piece of dicta, useful in its day in the process of circum­
venting unduly restrictive cases from the past, but which has 
blinded present analysis rather than liberated it.
Like market definition games, monopoly power games are usually 
dressed up in some analytical clothing from economic theorizing, 
lending respectability, if not insight, to the game. One view infers 
that statistical measures of market share justify an inference that 
monopoly power is magically present or that monopoly power is not 
present.63 There are few lawyers or even economists who would 
agree with this proposition, despite the tendency of courts, with 
which we all must deal, to look for shorthand formulas to resolve a 
most complex qualitative question. When all is said and done about 
market share, a court remains confronted with a question requiring 
a factual and legal value judgment, whatever the percentage share 
may be: Whether the conduct or structure of the firm involved, in 
the context of the industry and the circumstances unique to the 
case, warrants a legal judgment that it possesses or has exercised 
monopoly power — the power to fix prices or exclude competition 
free of the constraints of the competitive process. A belief that reli­
ance solely on economic analysis or shorthand legal rules can give 
one the ultimate answer to this complex question, rather than only
50. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
51. 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
52. Vietnamese Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 1981-2 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) 11 64,260 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (failure to show defendants possessed the requi­
site degree of monopoly power in the relevant market was fatal to monopolization 
charge); D.E. Rogers Assoc., Inc. v. Gardner-Denver Co., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) It 
64,024 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (70-80% market share of submarket does not prove monop­
oly power in the relevant product market).
53. See  articles cited supra  note 15.
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some tentative insights, or that statistical measures of market shares 
resolve the mystery, is a form of certitude not found elsewhere in 
human experience — and for good reason. That good reason is that 
detecting whether monopoly power exists or has been exercised for 
Sherman Act purposes requires a complex judgment based upon a 
number of intangible variables including an understanding of the in­
dustry, assumptions about what is acceptable industry structure or 
behavior in comtemporary society, the social, political and other 
goals of the Sherman Act, and an acute awareness of the facts of a 
particular case.64 An economist’s hypothesis of what would happen 
in an abstract world not in conformity with the facts of the case can 
be of some assistance in guiding a decision, but not a shining beacon 
lighting the only path and illuminatng the ultimate answer. At bot­
tom the question remains a legal and moral one of whether the de­
fendant’s structure or behavior under the circumstances “ought” to 
be found consistent or inconsistent with the purposes of section 2 of 
the Sherman Act.66 Substituting a mechanical formula for the com­
54. For some unique factual circumstances in monopolization cases, see Hecht v. 
Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D. D.C. 1977), cert, denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978) 
(natural monopoly); Structure Probe, Inc. v. The Franklin Inst., 450 F.Supp. 1272 
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (natural monopoly of first market entrant includes customer loyalty); 
Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979) 
(monopoly power thrust upon regulated dog track by racing board); Speed Auto 
Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 477 F.Supp. 1193 (D.C. N.Y. 1979); Island To­
bacco Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) H 63,988 (D. Hawaii
1981) (every manufacturer has a natural and complete monopoly over its particular 
product, especially where sold under its own private brand); Shayne v. National 
Hockey League, 504 F.Supp. 1023 (E.D. N.Y. 1980) (unique business of professional 
sports team); Parrish’s Cake Decorating Supplies v. Wilton Enter., 1980-81 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) H 63,769 (N.D. 111. 1981) (use of lawful means to achieve unlawful monop­
oly); Pacific Engineering & Prod’n Co. v. Kerr McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), 
cert, den ied , 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (behavior of duopolists).
55. For cases analyzing the facts of particular cases in this way, see Official Air­
line Guide, Inc. v. FTC, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 63,544 (2d Cir. 1980) (refusal to 
deal by a monopolist not benefitted by refusal, not unlawful monopolization); Byars 
v. Bluff City News Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979) (refusal to deal by monoo- 
polist judged by its overall economic impact and not the subjective intent of the mo­
nopolist); Fount-Wip, Inc. v. Reddi-Wip, Inc., 568 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1978) (refusals 
to deal which are anti competitive in purpose or effect or both, constitute an unrea­
sonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act); Janich Bros., Inc. v. 
American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 829 
(1979) (the Sherman Act is not a subsidy for inefficiency); Americana Indus., Inc. v. 
Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 556 F.2d 625 (1st Cir. 1977) (cutting admission prices 
in motion picture industry not per se unlawful); International Railways of Central 
America v. United Brands Co., 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 835 
(abandonment of unprofitable operation not act of monopolization); Hanson v. Shell
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plex judgment required by the legal process is about as productive 
as assuming that counting bodies, pacified villages, and tons of 
bombs dropped can reliably forecast who is winning a war.66
One can also detect the force of a misuse of economic theorizing 
in some other gross generalities indulged in by the third wave mo­
nopolization courts. For example, in Berkey Photo, Inc. u. Eastman 
Kodak Co.,61 the court assumed and stressed that Kodak was enti­
tled to reap “the competitive rewards attributable to its efficient 
size,” and that “an integrated business does not offend the Sherman 
Act whenever one of its departments benefits from association with 
a division possessing a monopoly in its own market.”®8 No inquiry 
was made about the “efficiencies” or “inefficiencies” of Kodak’s size, 
nor about the propriety of its vertical integration.69 A rule of “what 
will be, will be” was applied without deciding whether what was was 
an appropriate size or form of vertical integration in light of the dy­
namics of the industry and the policies of the Sherman Act. The 
Sherman Act is a constraint upon the freedom of a firm’s size, its
Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); Natrona 
Service, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 435 F.Supp. 99 (D. Wyo. 1977) (bad business 
judgment is not a violation of the Sherman Act); Copperstone v. Griswold Sporting 
Goods Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) II 61,623 (E.D. Mich, 1977) (manufacturer’s re­
fusal to deal with distributor was unilateral independent business decision based 
upon a legitimate business reason). See genera lly  Buffalo Courier-Express v. Buffalo 
Evening News, 601 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1979) (purchaser of dominant newspaper in­
tended to do as well as he could with the newspaper and had not lain awake thinking 
what the effect of competition might be on the competitor); Shapiro v. General Mo­
tors Corp., 472 F.Supp. 636 (D. Md. 1979), aff'd, Nos. 79-1792, 79-1794 (4th Cir. Nov.
20, 1980), cert, denied, 101 S.Ct. 1979 (1981) (favoring in-house inventor staff not 
violation of Sherman Act); SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3d 
Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978) (company’s entrenched position as drug 
supplier and rebate plan prevented competition for new non-patented drug); Note, 
Refusals to  D eal B y V ertically In tegra ted  M onopolist, 87 H a rv . L. R ev. 1720 (1974); 
Collin, Refusals to  D eal by M onopolist — R ecent Decisions, 14 A k ro n  L. R ev. 549
(1981).
56. See  Flynn, supra  note 2, at 342.
57. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
58. Id. at 276.
59. For an argument suggesting otherwise, see Note, Sherm an Section 2: A Case
of M isplaced Faith in the Innocence of Size, 4 S a n  F e r n .  V . L. R e v .  259 (1975). B ut 
see  Photoland Stores, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 63,030
(S.D. N.Y. 1979) (plaintiff’s bare bones allegation that since the defendant is large — 
a “giant monopoly” — it must be guilty of antitrust violations against a small firm 
which competes against the defendant in a limited area, was without any type of 
factual support and did not set forth a cognizable antitrust claim).
HeinOnline -- 13 U. T o l . L. Rev. 513 1981-1982
514 TOLEDO LAW  REVIEW [Vol. 13
vertical integration and its behavior,60 notwithstanding the meaning­
less cliche that “bigness is not necessariy bad.” Bigness is not neces­
sarily good either, and it is clear that the Congress which adopted 
the Sherman Act had grave suspicions about “bigness.”61 Assuming 
whatever firm size and integration exists is a part of the natural or­
der of things and beyond scrutiny by the court in a monopolization 
case is like requiring the plaintiff to kick off from behind its own 
goalpost or even from outside the stadium. It is the fallacy of deter­
mining the propriety of acceptable institutional structure and be­
havior by the predictions of a model detached from its moral and 
factual assumptions, or by the strange belief that an inexorable force 
like gravity dictates firm size and integration and that the resulting 
size or integration is or should be beyond examination.
We have yet to understand the workings of gravity in realms 
where there may be some justification for believing there are univer­
sal and immutable rules governing the behavior of celestial and 
other bodies. The affairs of humanity, however, are another matter. 
It is a part of the teachings of the common law that fixed and immu­
table rules are as dangerous as no rules at all. A fixed belief in the 
existence and workings of a magical and neutral force of competition 
and markets in all places and at all times belies an historical record 
and common experience to the contrary. If only the Supreme Court 
in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United Statesea and similar cases63 held 
such fixed beliefs, many power companies and other natural and un­
natural monopolists might rest a bit easier tonight about their verti­
cal integration and the advantages of size. If one assumes the condi­
tions of perfect competition exist at all times and that markets 
really work with the frictionless beauty of a perpetual motion ma­
chine in all circumstances, there might not be much to quarrel with 
in the Berkey court’s overly broad generalizations and assumptions. 
The problem is that the conclusions stated assume one of the basic 
questions the court was required to decide.64 As every lawyer trained
GO. T h is  is the primary assumption behind Judge Hand’s opinion in Alcoa. See 
supra  note 9. See also, L. B ra n d e is ,  T h e  C u r s e  op B ig n e s s  (1935); Schwartz, In stitu ­
tional S ize and Individual L iberty: A uthoritarian  A spects of Bigness, 55 Nw. U.L. 
R ev. 4 (1960).
61. See generally H. T h o r e l l i ,  T h e  F e d e r a l  A n t i t r u s t  P o lic y  (1955).
62. 410 U.S. 366, reh ’g denied, 411 U.S. 910, on rem and  360 F.Supp. 451 (D. 
Minn.), aff’d, 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
63. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
64. The court’s assumptions are stated at 603 F.2d at 273. For a critical analysis 
of the assumptions, see Flynn, supra  note 1, at 77-82.
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in the common law process knows, it is a bit silly and self-defeating 
to decide real world controversies by the unexamined assumptions 
of a model which may or may not be relevant to the case before the 
court, takes on different meanings in light of the facts and circum­
stances peculiar to the case before the court, and is applied in differ­
ent ways depending on the unique characteristics of the case and the 
particular goals of the law brought to the fore by the characteristics 
of the case before the court. It puts one in mind of Holmes’ attempt 
to settle “once and for all” railroad-crossing cases by decreeing that 
the auto driver must not only look and listen but also stop and get 
out of the vehicle, walk up to the tracks and investigate whether a 
train is coming.65 By the time all this was accomplished and a driver 
got back to the vehicle, several trains could be on their way to de­
stroy the hapless “reasonable man” who followed the demands of an 
unrealistic set of assumptions and the requirement that the assump­
tions dictate the rule to be followed in all cases. Even law school 
novitiates can see through the gossamer veil of such assumptions 
and the unacceptable consequences of such a methodology. Reality 
refuses to conform itself to the assumptions of even Justice Holmes.
Economic analysis of legal issues makes many lawyers uncom­
fortable. Part of the problem is that lawyers do not like to admit 
that the jargon of economics is sometimes incomprehensible or that 
one’s knowledge of statistics, algebra, and calculus is either nonexis­
tent or buried in one’s dim and distant past of high school or col­
lege. Moreover, you can be so impressed by the certitude with which 
many economists express their conclusions and the apparent scien­
tific certainty of the methodology used to arrive at conclusions66 
that you fear making yourself look foolish if you raise some simple 
questions about the veracity of the assumptions of the model, its 
predictions in light of the facts of a particular case, or the relevance 
of its narrow goals and the methodology wrapped up in the use of 
the model in light of the different demands of the goals and method­
ology of the legal process. The model appears one-dimensional,
65. B. & 0 . Ry. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), purportedly distinguished 
by Justice Cardozo, in Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
66. A distinguished legal historian, commenting on the “scientific pretensions” of 
economic analysis of legal issues has rightly (I believe) observed:
I have the strong feeling that the economic analysis of law has “peaked out” as 
the latest fad in legal scholarship and that it will soon be treated by the his­
torians of legal thought like the writings of Lasswell and McDougal, Future 
legal historians will need to exercise their imaginations to figure out why so 
many people could have taken most of this stuff so seriously.
Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 H o f s t r a  L. R ev. 905 (1980).
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while the legal issue is multi-dimensional. A further ground for dis­
comfort is the possibility that what some forms of economic analysis 
claim to be telling us and what lawyers in an antitrust case are con­
cerned about are two different things. It is in the last sense, let alone 
the others, that I think your discomfort about the way economic 
analysis is often used in antitrust cases is well justified.
Many forms of economic analysis are premised on constraints 
not present in the circumstances of most litigation — the model’s 
constraints of perfect competition, rational maximizers, pareto op­
timality and so on. The realities of cases lawyers encounter, cases 
like Berkey,87 the computer cases,88 and ReaLemon,89 and so on, do 
not abide by the factual assumptions and policy constraints of the 
model, its predictions or the ultimate question of whether the com­
petitive process has been or has not been unlawfully displaced by 
the structure or conduct of the alleged monopolist in ways at odds 
with the goals and policies of the law. Pretending otherwise, as too 
many recent monopolization cases have been doing, only confuses 
what lawyers and those with more sophisticated forms of economic 
analysis are interested in — what facts and factors in light of the 
broad policies underlying section 2 of the Sherman Act, the teach­
ings of history, the moral policies behind the antitrust laws and the 
circumstances of a particular case ought to be weighed and relied 
upon to prove or disprove a violation of the law? Mechanical appli­
cation of an abstract and artificial model to the facts of a case not in 
conformity with the assumptions of the model or the policies and 
methodology of the law is a process incapable of providing a rational 
and acceptable answer to the questions the law is asking or the goals 
the legal process seeks to achieve.
I do not wish to be understood as a total naysayer on the use of 
economic analysis in antitrust litigation, for I believe it can have a 
most significant and helpful role to play if properly invoked and 
used in antitrust cases. The careful but skeptical use of inductive 
economic analysis of the facts and circumstances of particular cases 
can lend helpful insights, but not fixed rules, for the attainment of
67. Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
68. See  Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), cert, de­
nied, 101 S.Ct. 3126 (1981); California Computer Prod. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 
(9th Cir. 1979); Greyhound Computer Corp., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1040, (1978); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp.,
481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979) Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F.Supp. 258 (N.D. 
Okla. 1973), rev ’d, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert, dism issed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
69. See supra  note 41.
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the legal system’s objectives. Among the many examples of this type 
of helpful economic analysis are Professor Schmallensee’s analysis of 
the Borden case,70 Joskow and Klevorick’s analysis of predatory 
pricing71 and that of Brodley and Hay on the same subject.72 The 
values underlying the model are entitled to some weight in light of 
the circumstances of the case, but not an exclusive or overriding 
weight. Unfortunately, however, many recent monopolization cases 
have not only been using economic insights as a limited potential 
beginning place for understanding the dynamics of the particular 
case for decision, but also as a deductive guillotine to dictate a result 
without regard for the facts of the case or the broader objectives of 
the law. It is this misuse of simplistic economic analysis, the gumball 
machine methodology, which is both characteristic of too many of 
the current antitrust cases and the type of economic analysis I think 
is objectionable, misleading, and irrelevant to the purpose of the 
Sherman Act and the function of law in our society.
B. Evolving Conduct Tests
Another feature of many of the recent monopolization cases is 
the emphasis courts place on the conduct element of the offense. It 
will be remembered that Judge Hand in Alcoa73 stated it was not 
enough to prove a section 2 violation simply to show a firm possesses 
a persistent and overwhelming share of a relevant market. There 
must be some additional evidence of conduct in the sense of “not 
honestly industrial”74 conduct directed toward acquiring or main­
taining that overwhelming market share. Judge Hand never quite 
explained what kind of conduct beyond mere existence and living 
day-by-day would constitute the kind of conduct sufficient to con­
vict a firm with a large market share of unlawful monopolization. 
Nor was it clear why conduct of this sort was required to prove a 
violation, although the harsh penalities of the antitrust laws proba­
bly justify a requirement that some kind of blameworthiness be laid 
at an offender’s door before punishment is justified. Even less clear 
was the question of what conduct by a firm with less than an over­
whelming market share — particularly the non-Alcoa type behav­
70. See supra  note 41.
71. See Joskow & Klevorick, supra  note 29.
72. Brodley & Hay supra  note 29. See also  F e d .  T r a d e  C om m ., S t r a t e g y ,  P r e ­
d a t i o n  a n d  A n t i t r u s t  A n a l y s i s  (1981).
73. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
74. Id. at 431.
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ioral case — might constitute unlawful monopolization or an a t­
tempt to monopolize. United States v. United Shoe Machinery 
Corp.16 and United States v. Griffith76 grappled with, but never 
clearly settled, the question of what kind and how much conduct 
evidence is necessary to show a firm with a monopoly has “monopo­
lized” as that concept is used in section 2 of the Sherman Act.
More recent cases, particularly the Berkey77 case and most of the 
computer cases, save Greyhound Computer Corp., Inc. v. IBM, 
Corp.,78 have appeared to increase the emphasis on the conduct ele­
ment of the offense by requiring proof that the conduct necessary to 
complete the offense be “predatory” rather than just “unnecessarily 
exclusionary” conduct. Hard competition by a monopolist, such as 
selective price cuts aimed at preventing inroads into the monopo­
list’s market,79 design changes to inhibit hooking up a competitor’s 
products to a defendant’s computer or phone system,80 or refusal to
75. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d p er  curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954),
76. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
77. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
78. See supra  note 68. See also Note, Greyhound v. IBM Corp.: Price Increases 
as a Form of Predatory Pricing, 7 R utgers J .  C o m p u te rs  T e c h . & L. 77 (1979).
79. See Flair Zipper Corp. v. Textron, Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas, (CCH) II 63,555 
(S.D. N.Y. 1980) (a manufacturer’s price reduction to meet a competitor’s prices did 
not establish a specific intent to monopolize or predatory conduct with a monopolistic 
purpose; the firm was merely meeting a competitive situation). See also  William Ing- 
lis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1981); 
California Computer Products v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); Tran­
samerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
80. Northeastern Telephone Co. v. AT&T Co., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 64,027 
(2d Cir. 1981); Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (defen­
dant’s development and introduction of a new generation of computers, as well as its 
development of more advanced peripheral products, were reasonable responses to the 
competition of plug compatible equipment manufacturers); California Computer 
Products v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979) (industry leader, though a mo­
nopolist, had the right to redesign its products to make them more attractive to buy­
ers, by reason of lower manufacturing cost and price or improved performance; mo­
nopolist under no duty to help peripheral equipment manufacturers to survive or 
expand); ILC Peripherals Leasing Co. v. IBM Corp., 458 F.Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978) 
(technological justifications for new peripheral parts: reasonable response to the com­
petition); In re Use of Carterphone Device, 13 F.C.C. 2d 420, reconsideration  denied, 
14 F.C.C. 571 (1968) (validity of design changes and refusals to allow terminal equip­
ment hookups to the phone system); Rapid Print, Inc. v. Minn. Mining and Manufac­
turing Co., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 63,787 (D. Mass. 1981) (machine supplier had 
no duty under the antitrust laws to tailor the design of its product to aid potential 
competing manufacturers’ sales of rival products); Gribbon, Does th e  Law of M onop­
o liza tion  Inhibit Innovative Behavior?, 49 A n t i t r u s t  L. J. 925 (1980).
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predisclose new film formats or photo finishing processes prejudicing 
competing camera sellers and photofinishers respectively,81 is 
treated as pro-competitive conduct and not “predatory” conduct one 
can rely upon to prove unlawful monopolization. In part, this change 
from the Alcoa and United Shoe conduct standards may be attribu­
table to the fact that most of the current monopolization litigation is 
treble damage private litigation, while most of the litigation in ear­
lier times was government-initiated litigation seeking equitable re­
lief displacing monopoly power rather than punishing specific con­
duct exercising monopoly power.82 As we shall see later, whether the 
plaintiff is the government or a private plaintiff seeking treble dam­
ages can make a significant difference in both the kind and the qual­
ity of conduct evidence courts will allow a plaintiff to rely upon to 
prove a firm with a monopoly has unlawfully “monopolized.” For 
the moment, however, it would appear that most of the current mo­
nopolization litigation — government or private — has been focus­
ing inordinately on conduct issues when the case is not dismissed on 
market definition issues. The conduct relied upon must be conduct 
which sinks below the ordinarily competitive level or the standard of 
“unnecessarily exclusionary” to some ill-defined level of “predatory” 
or unfair conduct. Little significance is given by most of the opinions 
to the fact that the conduct is by a firm with monopoly power, 
rather than just an ordinary firm. Earlier cases83 did so, perhaps in a 
common sense recognition of the well-known observation by the 
mouse who purportedly fell asleep one night next to an elephant. 
When the badly injured mouse reported his experience to his fellow 
mice the next day, he observed: “It was frightening — you sure 
know it when one of those damn things sneezes or rolls over.” 
Judge Browning, in Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM  Corp.,84 
took the view of the mouse by holding that once a jury has found a 
defendant has monopoly power, the monopolist is “precluded from 
employing otherwise lawful practices that unnecessarily excluded
81. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979); GAF 
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) U 64,205 (S.D. N.Y. 1981) 
(manufacturer’s failure to fully disclose technical information regarding its new film 
and finishing process not the basis of any Section 2 liability here).
82. See Flynn, supra  note 1, at 2, 22.
83. Particularly Alcoa, U nited  Shoe, and Grinnell. See also Eastman Kodak Co. 
v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); United States v. Klearfox 
Linen Looms, 63 F. Supp. 32 (D, Minn. 1945).
84. 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977).
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competition”86 from the market. Few other recent cases have 
adopted a similar standard, with the most prominent of those refus­
ing to do so being the Berkey case, although the Government’s case 
charging AT&T with monopolization,86 still underway in the District 
of Columbia (unless Congress and the Administration prevent Mr. 
Baxter from litigating it “up to the eyeballs”),87 should raise the is­
sue once again. In Greyhound, IBM has engaged in several market­
ing practices that an ordinary competitor might choose to follow, 
just as Kodak’s conduct in the Berkey case might be viewed as nor­
mally competitive activity in an industry not dominated by a single 
firm. The Greyhound case allowed the otherwise normal but “un­
necessarily exclusionary” conduct evidence to go to the jury, how­
ever, because IBM could be found to have monopoly power over the 
leasing of general purpose computers and its conduct must be 
weighed in light of that reality. The Berkey case would not allow 
otherwise normal but exclusionary under the circumstances conduct 
by a monopolist to go to the jury unless it was first deemed to be 
legally predatory conduct. The fact that the conduct was engaged in 
by a monopolist was not sufficient in Berkey to allow the conduct to 
be weighed by a jury on the unnecessarily exclusionary basis derived 
from the Alcoa and United Shoe tradition. Berkey ignores the fact 
that, as elsewhere in the law, the elements in a legal test for drawing 
the line of illegality are relational and not independent categories. 
Treating each step of the analysis as separate and distinct produces 
the incomplete portrait of a paint by the numbers exercise rather 
than an artistic effort.
In a preliminary opinion in the United States u. AT& T Co.88 
case, upholding the Government’s case over Bell’s motion to dismiss 
at the end of the Government’s case, the court applied the Grey­
hound standard to Bell’s conduct and took account of the relation­
ship between monopoly power and conduct. Once a firm has been 
found to possess monopoly power, the traditional test has been that 
the firm has an affirmative duty to avoid unreasonably excluding 
others.80 If there is a substantive conflict here, and I believe there is,
85. Id. at 498.
86. United States v. A T & T  Co., 1031 A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  R eg . R ep. (BNA) H -l 
(Sept. 17, 1981) (remarks prepared tentative to settlement of the case).
87. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 6.
88. See supra  note 86.
89. See Flynn, supra  note 1, at 118. See also  Massena v. Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corp., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 63,526 (N.D. N.Y. 1980) (follows Greyhound  stan­
dard, but carries the reasoning one step further to find that nothing in the Sherman
HeinOnline -- 13 U. T o l . L. Rev. 520 1981-1982
Spring 1982] MONOPOLIZATION LITIGATION  521
sooner or later the conflict must be resolved by the Supreme Court. 
The conflict can be viewed either as an evidentiary one of what kind 
of conduct a plaintiff must show before a jury or trial court acting as 
a fact-finder will be permitted to consider the case, or as a conflict 
over the standard of proof a jury or fact-finder must apply before it 
may conclude a monopolist has illegally monopolized. The conflict is 
one between defining a monopolist’s duty and the level of the bur­
den of proof the plaintiff must bear before a fact-finder may find the 
duty has been breached. Berkey requires proof that the conduct be 
“predatory” as a way to draw a line between conduct which is an 
exercise of monopoly power and conduct which is an expression of 
“efficiency” and legitimate competition by the presumably efficient 
vertically integrated possessor of the inherently right size. Grey­
hound sees the question as one of increasing the duties of elephants 
as they grow in size to avoid disrupting the competitive process, 
with the elephant’s otherwise normal behavior an issue of fact for 
jurors to weigh once the court has defined the duty and the standard 
of proof for its breach.
The division of judge and jury functions and the scope of appel­
late review of contested lower court findings is deeply affected by 
which path one chooses to follow. An elephant’s size, even when it is 
doing the same innocent things as other beasts in the forest, is seen 
by the Greyhound court as a factor a jury must weigh in light of the 
potential consequences for those who innocently get in the way and 
are injured by conduct which would not otherwise harm the inno­
cent when engaged in by non-elephants. The Berkey court is willing 
to let elephants have their way so long as their conduct is not objec­
tively “predatory,” without reference to the elephant’s size, 
whatever “predatory” may mean standing alone and without refer­
ence to the other facts of the case.
These conflicting approaches are at the heart of many current 
monopolization cases. It is a conflict presenting the troublesome 
task of how we go about sorting out pro-competitive and anti-com­
petitive behavior in light of a defendant’s size, structure of the in­
dustry and other facts unique to the case. Both pro- and anti-com­
petitive behavior injure competitors; some better standard capable 
of consistent application must be found to distinguish one from the 
other.90 The issue is also one of finding a means for drawing the line
Act requires a monopolist to affirmatively assist potential competition by subsidizing 
their entry into the marketplace or granting them preferential access to a unique 
facility).
90. For some suggested standards, see Flynn, supra  note 1, at 114-28.
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between judge and jury functions, a responsibility ignored in too 
many antitrust cases. What is needed is a better standard to accom­
plish both the objective of distinguishing pro-competitive conduct 
from that which unreasonably displaces the competitive process, and 
the objective of protecting the constitutional right of plaintiffs and 
defendants to have questions of fact determined by a jury. Until a 
workable standard is found, conflicting precedent on the conduct 
standard guarantees conduct will be the major issue in most future 
monopolization litigation, public or private.
C. The Im pact of Deregulation
Several recent monopolization cases have also involved regulated 
industries or industries in the process of being deregulated. The 
Burger Court has been particularly activist in following up on the 
Warren Court’s narrowing of the scope of exemptions from the anti­
trust laws. In the Warren Court era, several cases restrictively inter­
preted the scope of federal regulation exempting the regulated from 
antitrust liability by tightening up the doctrine of primary jurisdic­
tion and its application.91 The Burger Court has been doing the 
same thing with state-regulated monopolists by narrowing the state 
action exemption for inconsistent schemes of state regulation9* and 
by limiting the scope of state regulation by expanding constitutional 
doctrines by devices such as finding a first amendment right of com­
mercial speech.93 This has meant that many of the practices of regu­
lated industries previously thought immune from examination on 
antitrust standards might be open to antitrust attack where the spe­
cific practice is not expressly exempt, or where it is not an activity 
aggressively and affirmatively regulated by some “sovereign” author­
ity of the state. In City of Mishawaka v. American Electric Power 
Co.94 federal regulation of wholesale electric rates and state regula­
tion of the retail rates of an electric power company did not pre­
clude the application of federal antitrust policy to a price squeeze by 
A.E.P.’s manipulation of its regulated wholesale and retail rate
91. See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Pacific Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966); United 
States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S.
482 (1962). See generally  Sullivan, supra  note 12, at 746-49.
92. See  California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 
U.S. 97 (1980); Fox, The Suprem e Court A nd The Confusion Surrounding The S ta te  
Action D octrine, 48 A n t i t r u s t  L. J. 1571 (1980).
93. See  Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. 
v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
94. 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981).
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structure to injure competing municipal power companies. In the 
government’s AT&T98 case, the trial court has held the existence of 
regulation of Bell’s activity is not dispositive of the Government’s 
monopolization claim, and that deregulation of connecting equip­
ment by the Carterphone90 decision of the FCC opens Bell’s prac­
tices restricting the use of non-Bell equipment in the phone system 
to antitrust scrutiny.
Lawsuits by Bell’s competitors seeking treble damages for vari­
ous Bell activities have reached divergent results. M.C.I.’s billion 
dollar plus judgment is on appeal97 and a federal district court in 
New York has entered a $277 million verdict for Litton against 
Bell.98 Meanwhile, the Second Circuit reversed a $16.5 million judg­
ment against Bell in Northeastern Telephone Co. v. AT& T". In all 
three cases, FCC regulation was found not to preclude application of 
the antitrust laws to a variety of activities by AT&T. For example, 
in Northeastern Telephone Co. the absence of FCC action pursuant 
to a specific congressional grant of authority or a pervasive scheme 
of regulation evidencing a congressional intent to exempt the activ­
ity in question from antitrust constraints subjected Bell to potential 
antitrust liability for practices in dealing with another phone com­
pany. The court, by applying the Areeda-Turner marginal cost stan­
dard100 to Bell’s pricing practices, held Northeastern failed to prove 
AT&T’s conduct constituted predatory pricing or that Bell had en­
gaged in an anti-competitive manipulation of coupler designs for 
P.B.X.s. The Northeastern case stands for a narrow reading on the 
scope of exempted activity of a previously assumed regulated indus­
try. Even in this additional Second Circuit opinion ignoring the sec­
tion 2 “elephant” precedent of Alcoa and United Shoe, the pre­
sumption against exemption from antitrust constraints for a 
regulated industry is a strong one and cases like Northeastern ap­
pear to be making it stronger than in the past.
If one surveys the monopolization cases of the past ten years, 
many of them are cases involving an industry partially or exten-
95. United States v. AT&T, 1031 A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  R eg . R ep. (B N A ) H -l 
(Sept. 17, 1981).
96. 13 F.C.C. 2d 420 (1968).
97. MCI Inc. v. AT&T Co., 947 A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  R eg . Rep. A-20 (Jan, 17,
1980); 969 A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  R eg . R ep . (B.N.A.) A-3 (June 19, 1980).
98. Litton Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) H 64,306 (S.D. N.Y.
1981).
99. 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) H 64,027 (2d Cir. 1981).
100. See supra  note 28.
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sively regulated.101 The explanation for this state of affairs is a com­
bination of several factors, including the shift in doctrine on the 
scope of the primary jurisdiction and state action concepts. In both 
areas the scope of the exemption has been substantially narrowed by 
the courts, thereby greatly expanding the potential antitrust liability 
of firms which have long assumed they are vaccinated against anti­
trust liability. Moreover, many regulated industries are monopolies 
by definition, and therefore are usually sued under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act when their conduct strays from the shelter of the regu­
latory scheme. Regulated companies in many industries are not yet 
sensitive to their potential antitrust liability, and act accordingly. 
Competitors are not just injured, but they are injured by less than 
subtle, and often blatant, anti-competitive conduct.102 In other 
cases, the intersection of antitrust and regulation is not very clear 
and little or no precedent exists on the question of the scope of im­
munity.103 A regulated industry acts with the peril that judicial 
hindsight may find the activity not clearly or validly exempt and 
therefore subject to antitrust scrutiny. In still other cases the aura of 
regulation generates activity later judged not to be within the 
scheme of regulation or not actively enough regulated to escape 
scrutiny under antitrust policy.104
These realities, and the fact that the defendant by definition is 
usually a monopolist, make many regulated industries a happy hunt­
ing ground for antitrust litigators and will likely insure significant 
future monopolization litigation in the regulated industries area. It 
is a characteristic of several recent monopolization cases and one 
likely to continue. Lawyers serving such clients should not only take 
note, but should also keep abreast of the rapidly changing doctrine 
in the area because today’s standards have a way of being ignored or
101. See cases cited infra notes 102-04. See also  United States v. AT&T Co., 
1031 A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  R eg . R ep. (BNA) H -l (Sept. 17, 1981). Town of Misha­
waka, Inc, v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 
449 U.S. 1096 (1981); Mid-Texas Communications Sys. v. AT&T Co., 615 F.2d 1372 
(5th Cir.), cert, denied, 101 S.Ct. 286 (1980); City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & 
Power Co., 497 F.Supp. 1040 (D. Conn. 1980); T.V. Signal of Aberdeen v. AT&T Co., 
1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) It 63,944 (D. S.D. 1981).
102. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, rehearing denied, 
411 U.S. 910 (1973); Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Alcoa, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 
1971), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
103. See  Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973); United States v. 
Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
104. See Cantor v, Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia 
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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rapidly displaced by tommorrow’s court decisions in this era of 
“deregulation.”
D. The Significance of Private Monopolization Cases
A further characteristic of recent monopolization litigation is 
that most of it, by a surprisingly large margin, is treble damage liti­
gation rather than government-litigated cases.108 In the past few 
years there has been a veritable epidemic of private section 2 cases, 
compared to previous generations of section 2 litigation. This is a 
factor which was not present in the Alcoa-United, Shoe era of mo­
nopolization litigation. It is a factor of more significance than merely 
a confirmation of the growth in private antitrust and litigation ex­
pertise by the private bar and the growing willingness of major busi­
nesses to sue each other. In the genteel past, members of the eco­
nomic establishment simply did not sue each other but usually 
resolved conflicts at the “club.” The fact that a monopolization case 
is a private damage action has a substantive impact, particularly on 
the conduct element of the case. This is because conduct occurs in 
two different senses in a private monopolization case: one must not 
only show that some conduct by a firm with monopoly power caused 
unlawful monopolization, but also that the unlawful monopolization 
is in fact the conduct which caused the specific antitrust injury 
about which the plaintiff complains.106 To put it another way, there 
are two levels of causation — one in law, the other in fact. A private 
plaintiff needs to show a violation of law caused the plaintiff mea­
surable antitrust injury (factual causation), but to show a violation, 
a plaintiff must show conduct proving a defendant with monopoly 
power has caused monopolization to take place (legal causation).
As the Berkey107 case illustrates, proof of conduct completing a 
section 2 violation (i.e., monopolization), without proof that the spe­
cific violation caused the plaintiff specific antitrust injury (is factu­
ally connected to claimed antitrust injury), is not sufficient to up­
hold a verdict. The element of factual causation justifying a damage 
verdict has not been proved. Berkey’s camera claim and its claim
105. See Flynn, supra  note 1, at 33.
106. Id.
107. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). “Re­
cently we have also seen conduct evidence used to exculpate monopoly power where it 
clearly seemed to exist and its existence appeared to injure the public interest, even 
though the private plaintiff bringing the case had problems with proving causation 
and the fact of damage.” Flynn, N o Conduct M onopolization: A n A ssessm ent for the  
L aw yer and Businessm an, 49 A n t i t r u s t  L. J. 1255, 1271 (1980).
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that Kodak unlawfully monopolized by refusing to disclose its new 
film format to competing camera manufacturers failed on this 
ground. Berkey’s additional claim for overcharges in the film and 
color paper markets was also reversed, in part by the creation of an 
impractical and ridiculous causation test that required Berkey to 
prove a factual connection between the amount of overcharge and 
Kodak’s wrongful conduct making a monopoly many years in the 
past and making the present day monopoly overcharge possible. A 
more sensible test would have imposed the burden on Kodak to dis­
prove a connection between illegal conduct in the past and plain­
tiffs damage in the present, and would allow the jury to determine 
if that burden had been carried and by what margin.108
The interrelationship between conduct to prove a violation and 
conduct to prove damages places unique limitations on the conduct 
element in private cases, because the conduct evidence in a private 
case must do double duty — prove both a violation of the law, and a 
nexus or factual connection between the violation and measurable 
antitrust injury to a particular plaintiff. Cases like Berkey pivot on 
the conduct and causation element, a factor which can severely limit 
the kind of conduct a private plaintiff may rely upon to prove a vio­
lation of the law, measurable antitrust damage to the particular 
plaintiff, and the amount of damage. Whether such cases are strong 
precedent on the conduct element in subsequent government cases, 
or even in other private treble damage cases, is problematical at 
best, because the conduct element of each case is necessarily sui 
generis in light of the double function conduct must usually play in 
the liability and damage phases of the case.
E. Other Characteristics
There are some other noticeable characteristics of present day 
monopolization litigation. The procedural and discovery complexity 
of the big monopolization cases, a feature noted by President 
Carter’s Antitrust Commission,108 has begun to get out of hand — 
well out of hand. The Antitrust Division’s IBM case is in its twelfth 
year, now dismissed — almost six years of it in trial. Over at the 
FTC, a case challenging the structure of the oil industry in the 
Southeast United States was finally abandoned this year after it was 
admitted the case was too big for even Ralph Nader to hope it could
108. Flynn, supra  note 1, at 89-90.
109. See supra  note 7, at 151-54.
HeinOnline -- 13 U. T o l . L. Rev. 526 1981-1982
Spring 1982] MONOPOLIZATION LITIGATION  527
ever be successfully litigated.110 Among the motions filed and fully 
litigated by such friends of the environment as Mobil, Gulf, Shell 
and Socal was one claiming the FTC was required to file an environ­
mental impact statement when filing its case.111 Upon reflection, af­
ter seeing how many trees have been sacrificed to keep the paper 
flowing in the case, maybe the motion was not as specious and far­
fetched as it first seemed. The “Cereal Case” on a shared monopoly 
theory has probably seen its last days as a result of the administra­
tive law judge finding the FTC had failed to prove its case.112 After 
seven or eight years of the respondents hysterically fighting the case 
in every conceivable forum, including lawsuits by the city of Battle 
Creek,113 union demonstrations114 and assaults on the FTC budget 
by hometown members of Congress from Michigan,116 it is anticli- 
mactic to see a case which has exposed the current meaning of “pro­
priety” for legislators and generated so much heat and so little light 
disposed of on such a mundane ground as failure to prove the claim.
The discovery and procedural morass characteristic of most mo­
nopolization litigation cannot help but have several effects upon the 
decision to bring cases, the standards courts and the FTC apply in 
the cases which are brought, and the overwhelming drain a case can 
mean for a court or client confronted with the case. Fear of the mo­
rass itself may begin killing off the litigation or preventing the trial 
of legitimate defenses, because few firms or even the government 
can afford to bring or defend a case when it gets out of control. I 
suspect, and with good reason, that the ability to make a case a pro­
110. In re Exxon Corp., No. 8934, 3 T r a d e  R e g .  R e p . (CCH) H 21,866 (F.T.C.
1981).
111. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1977).
112. In re Kellogg Co., No. 8883, 3 T r a d e  R e g .  R e p . (CCH) H 21,864 (F.T.C.
1981) (administrative law judge dismissed FTC complaint on grounds the staff failed 
to substantiate their conspiracy to monopolize or shared monopoly theories). See  
Mueller, Advertising, M onopoly and the F .T .C .’s Cereal Case: An ‘A ttack on A dver­
tis in g ’?, 6 A n t i t r u s t  L .  &  E c o n .  R e v .  59 (1973).
113. 945 A n titru st  T rade R e g . R e p . (B N A ) A-27 (Jan . 3, 1980) (W .D. M ich. 
1979).
114. Union pressure in the cereal case did cause the FTC to permit union inter­
vention in antitrust proceedings which threaten jobs. See 955 A n titru st  & T rade 
R e g .  R e p . (BN A ) A-12, F -l (Mar. 13, 1980); Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1980, at 12, col. 2.
115. House Subcom m ittee A pproves R estriction  on F T C ’s Cereal Case, 1020 A n ­
titr u st  & T rade R eg . R e p . (BNA) A-10 (June 25, 1981). See also 1002 An titru st  & 
T rade R eg . R e p . (BNA) A-2 (Feb. 19, 1981); 1039 A n titru st  & T rade R eg . R e p . 
(BNA) A-22 (Nov. 12, 1981) (Sen. Riegle reportedly held up FTC budget to prevent 
appeal of the case from Administrative Law Judge dismissal of the action).
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cedural morass has itself become a prime litigating strategy on the 
part of both plaintiffs and defendants; one likely to be followed if it 
appears that a case can be won by litigating everything but the mer­
its. The recent action by the federal district court in Litton Sys­
tems, Inc. v. AT& T  Co.118 of denying attorney’s fees to the success­
ful ($277 million verdict) plaintiffs lawyers for alleged gross 
negligence and willful misconduct in responding to discovery re­
quests may be part of a trend toward preventing abuse of the mo­
rass of a big case by the use of sanctions. In United Nuclear Corp. u. 
General Atomic Co.,117 a state supreme court upheld an antitrust 
default judgment worth hundreds of millions of dollars for a refusal 
to comply with valid discovery orders. To the extent that these cases 
may represent a strategy of winning by excessive gamesmanship, the 
tactic may backfire if the noticeable trend of some courts getting 
tough with those charged with engaging in such conduct continues 
to develop.
A further feature of modern monopolization litigation is the 
greater willingness of the parties to politicize the process of litigat­
ing the case. Whether rightly or wrongly, the cereal companies took 
their case to Congress while it was pending at the FTC. In Congress, 
the issue was not whether the companies had violated the law or 
not, but whether Congress should fiddle with the FTC’s budget as 
the budget applied to a specific case.118 Winning a case by a line 
item vetoing the enforcement agency’s budget to maintain the case 
may be shrewd politics, but scarcely comports with, among other 
things, the traditional limits on the propriety of tactics for litigating 
cases. At one time, the consensus of the profession and members of 
Congress was that cases were tried on their merits in the forum des­
ignated by law and not by one’s political clout in Congress. There 
was a time when even Congress was shocked by such tactics and 
gave short shrift to such special interest legislation in cases like the 
attempt to overrule the El Paso merger case by special legislation.118
116. 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 64,306 (S.D. N.Y. 1981).
117. 597 P.2d 290 (N.M. Sup. Ct.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 911 (1979).
118. 1000 A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  R e g . Rep. (BNA) A-14 (manufacturers attack 
charges of monopoly as a discredited theory); 1006 A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  R eg . Rep. 
(BNA) A-20 (Mar. 19, 1981) (Members of Congress from Michigan have introduced 
bills to place a moratorium on any decision in the FTC case until Congress has con­
sidered the question of prosecuting shared monopolies. Kellogg, based in Battle 
Creek, Michigan, has endorsed the shared congressional effort).
119. Litigation of the E l Paso case began in 1957 with a government challenge of 
El Paso Natural Gas Company’s acquisition of the Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corpo­
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Times and the members of Congress change, however, and if litigat­
ing pending cases by legislative attacks becomes an accepted tactic 
and the new ethical standard for defining a legislator’s duty to the 
folks back home and a lawyer’s duty to his client, future antitrust 
institutes should devote sessions to lobbying skills rather than liti­
gating skills. Lawyers handling tax cases and defending criminal 
cases might take note and follow the same tactics if their clients 
have enough funds and friendly members of Congress complain 
enough to respond. Law schools and CLE Programs should offer 
courses in how to channel campaign contributions to P.A.C.s with a 
minimum of publicity and how to achieve technical compliance with 
the minimal standards of campaign finance laws.
AT&T has been a bit more direct in response to Mr. Baxter’s 
original but quickly evaporating promise to litigate the Govern­
ment’s AT&T  case “up to the eyeballs.”120 Instead of seeking to un­
dermine the case by amending the enforcement agency’s budget, 
AT&T has sought legislation legalizing that structure of the Bell 
system that the government claims is illegal.121 For some reason the 
Administration has given the Commerce Department a big say in 
the Justice Department’s case and the Department of Defense has 
trotted out “national security”12® as a grounds for Congress to avoid 
application to AT&T of the law with which everyone else is sup­
posed to live. The Senate has passed the Bell bill by a lopsided mar­
gin123; it will be interesting to see what happens in the House now 
that the lobbying battle has heated up.
While there may be some truly unique cases where Congress 
should intervene to stay the hand of a mistaken prosecution, one not 
in the broader national interest, or by an agency gone amuck, I do
ration. Litigation of the case to full divestiture, 17 years later, in 1974, involved at 
least eight proceedings in the Supreme Court, four of which provoked significant Su­
preme Court opinions. Utah Public Serv. Comm. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 
U.S.. 464 (1969), reh’g denied, 399 U.S. 937 (1970); Cascade Natural Gas Co. v. El 
Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967), on remand, 291 F.Supp. 3 (D. Utah 1968), 
vacated, 395 U.S. 464 (1969), reh'g denied, 399 U.S. 937 (1970); United States v. El 
Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
The political battles of the case are reported in Hearings, The Antitrust Improve­
ments Act of 1975, Part I, U .S . S e n a t e  A n t i t r u s t  M o n o p o ly  S u b co m m ., S e n a t e  J u ­
d ic i a r y  C om m . 432 (1975).
120. See supra note 87 (now dismissed on tentative settlement).
121. See S.898 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 1980; H.R.6121 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 1980.
122. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 6, & § D, at 3, col. 1.
123. Wall St. J., “A. T. & T. Measure Passes Senate on 94-to-4 Vote”, October 8, 
1981, at 6, col. 1.
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not think these two cases present such a circumstance. If “Baby 
Bell”124 can be sufficiently separated from the regulated side of the 
business by the Bell bill, for example, to meet the antitrust and reg­
ulatory concerns of opponents of the bill, it is difficult to understand 
why Baby Bell should not be spun off completely. Special interest 
legislation of this sort represents a noticeable trend in some modern 
monopolization litigation — a disturbing and undue politicizing of 
the process of enforcing the law in the courts. For those apparently 
large enough or those with sufficient political clout, appeal to the 
rule of law through the judicial process is not good enough. A few 
years ago, this kind of response — politicizing the process — usually 
met with universal disdain or at least indignant columns in the press 
by muckrakers. Things have gone so far the other way, however, 
that even the Assistant Attorney General and the Chairman of the 
FTC can implicitly claim the authority to amend laws Congress has 
passed by decreeing they will not bring cases against those persons 
to whom Congress intended the law be applied125 and that they will 
intervene in private cases they believe of no merit, even though Con­
gress gave private parties the exclusive right to bring their own 
cases. The law makes no mention of the government coming in on 
one side or the other of a private case. In a case with which I was 
involved where government intervention was repeatedly hinted, I 
hoped the government would do so. It would have been interesting 
to undertake a little discovery from the government’s files and 
phone logs to learn who or what was behind the government’s inter­
est in the case and why the government appeared so anxious to 
bring information I thought irrelevant to the case to the trial judge’s 
attention. The government should be treated as a party, if they in­
tervene in private cases, in light of the substantial risk generated by 
the realities of modern politics that the intervention is on behalf of 
a friend of a litigant and not because the government is acting as a 
friend of the court.
I have no doubt that well-intentioned enforcement officials can 
and should become irritated with the fact that most of the litigation 
defining the meaning and scope of the antitrust laws is beyond their 
control. That is because the vast majority of litigated cases are pri­
124. Wall St. J., “Bill to Deregulate Much of Bell’s Phone Business and Let It 
Enter Data Field Goes to Senate Today,” October 1, 1981, at 48, col. 1.
125. This is particularly the case with regard to vertical and conglomerate merg­
ers and enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act. Congressional criticism is mount­
ing, and properly so, on just this basis. See 1037 A n t i t r u s t  &  T r a d e  R e g . R ep . 
(BNA). A-8 (Oct. 28, 1981).
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vate ones, not government cases. At times, the decision in a private 
case can have widespread ramifications for public enforcement. Con­
gress has mandated such a system, however, and has made no allow­
ance for public officials in the exercise of their enforcement discre­
tion to intervene in the exercise of a private litigant’s enforcement 
discretion. In this area, the only tampering with public or private 
enforcement discretion has been Congress’ decision to permit the in­
tervention of private parties in public enforcement and not vice 
versa. Government abuse in the consent decree process126 led to the 
amending of Section 5 of the Clayton Act127 to open the consent 
decree process for comment by those having an interest in the de­
cree. No similar amendment of our basic antitrust statutes has been 
proposed, justified or enacted to provide for government interven­
tion or comment in private cases. Moreover, I believe it would be 
unwise and counterproductive to do so or to permit the government 
to do so by appealing for the exercise of judicial discretion to permit 
amicus participation out of an undue judicial respect for government 
expertise. Government intervention in private cases should be lim­
ited to amicus curiae participation at the unilateral invitation of the 
court, and only then at the appellate level in unusually significant 
cases where the court concludes it wishes to have the views of those 
charged with public enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Enforcement discretion is a valuable and necessary thing, but it 
can be carried too far, constituting an assumption of legislative or 
judicial functions. For example, the proposal of Mr. Baxter to selec­
tively intervene in private suits is an unwise, as well as unautho­
rized, step because the enforcement agencies will find themselves be­
sieged by lobbyists pleading for government intervention on one side 
or the other in many, if not every, private case. Enough lobbying of 
this type currently takes place with regard to inducing or preventing 
amicus participation by the government in private litigation reach­
ing the Supreme Court. While our present leaders of the enforce­
ment agencies may be persons of impeccable integrity and the high­
est ideals, sooner or later in our present climate of excessive 
financial influence in our political life, an undue politicizing of the 
process can be expected, if not predicted. Politicizing the process 
becomes undue when the appearance, as well as the reality, of politi­
cal favoritism influencing a decision to intervene takes place. With
126. For the legislative history of the amendment, see [1974] U.S. C o d e  C o n g . & 
A dm in . N e w s  6535.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1976).
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all the corporate and other special interest P.A.C.s about, I do not 
see how either risk can be avoided, no matter how upstanding en­
forcement officials may be. The proposal that the Antitrust Division 
be free to intervene in private cases strikes me as not only poorly 
thought out and unwise, but also naive and dangerous for the effec­
tive, honest, and evenhanded enforcement of the law. Moreover, it is 
arrogant to believe that all the wisdom for what “ought” to be a 
violation of the law in particular cases resides in the Antitrust Divi­
sion. Congress has placed its trust elsewhere — in an adversary pro­
cess supervised by the courts and subject to appellate review, the 
objective review of judges with a perspective not confined by a the­
ology out of touch with reality, nor by the transitory political needs 
of an incumbent administration, nor by a politically distorted view 
of the practical affairs of the world.
It is likely that the current attitude of enforcement officials will 
result in a substantial decline in government section 2 cases and ef­
forts to slow down the filing of private ones or, if Mr. Baxter is to be 
believed, an unwise and dangerous attempt to intervene in private 
cases the incumbent Administration does not like. While changing 
the emphasis of enforcement policy is probably justified as a matter 
of enforcement discretion and because of shifts in philosophy as a 
result of the election returns in some instances, the basis on which 
the authority to change that emphasis is now being claimed skates 
perilously close to an undue exercise of executive and administrative 
power. It is a risky venture inviting an undue politicizing of the pro­
cess of enforcing the antitrust laws. It does not seem that Abscam, 
Watergate and Dita Beard were quite that far in the past. Appar­
ently, times have changed or our memories are indeed short.
III. T h o u g h t s  F or  I m p r o v in g  t h e  P r o c e s s
Given these characteristics of current monopolization litigation 
— its costs, its length, its complexity, and its political sensitivity — 
are there better ways to deal with monopoly power in the economy? 
Some proposals have been made in recent years, although not many 
appear likely to be adopted in the current political climate. I men­
tion them only in summary fashion, but note that other reforms of 
the antitrust laws, such as the Celler-Kefauver Act and the Hart, 
Scott, Rodino Act, took a decade to achieve — but they did become 
law.
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A. Adoption of No Conduct Monopolization
President Carter’s Antitrust Commission recommended study of 
something called “no conduct monopoly.”128 This idea suggests that 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act be amended to provide for a govern­
ment— initiated case against firms found to possess persistent mo­
nopoly power. The action would not be available in private cases, 
nor would it have any res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in 
subsequent private cases. The Government would be required to 
show that a defendant possessed persistent monopoly power in a sig­
nificant part of commerce. Upon such a showing, the case would 
proceed to the remedy issue, where the normal remedy would be dis­
solution or divestiture. In the remedy phase of the case, “efficien­
cies” would be a defense to dissolution or divestiture and, where 
shown, would preclude dissolution or divestiture. Conduct issues 
would play little or no role in the case, because the focus of the case 
would be the defendant’s persistent possession of monopoly power. 
The rationales for the proposal are that no conduct monopolization 
would deal efficiently with the central issue in major structural mo­
nopolization cases without undue conduct evidence, that issues of 
efficiency would receive their due in the remedy phase of the case, 
and that the absence of a risk of treble damage litigation or other 
penalties following the Government’s case imposed thereby would 
reduce the present tendency toward and oppportunity for endless 
litigation.129
B. Adoption of a Duty-Risk Methodology in Private Litigation
We do not have time here to elaborate upon a proposal for treble 
damage monopolization litigation I have made elsewhere.130 Under 
this method of breaking down a case, there would be four distinct 
issues a treble damage plaintiff would be required to prove before a
128. See supra note 7, at 154.
129. See Dougherty, Kirkwood & Hurwitz, Elimination of the Conduct Require­
ment in Government Monopolization Cases, 37 W a s h . & L e e  L . R ev . 83 (1980); 
Flynn, Proposed Elimination of the Conduct Requirement for Proving Monopoliza­
tion in Government Cases Under Section 2 Statement, 48 A B A  A n t i t r u s t  L . J. 845 
(1979); Flynn, No Conduct Monopolization: An Assessment for the Lawyer and Bus­
inessman, 49 A n t i t r u s t  L . J. 1255 (1980); Hart, Milman, Stein, Brett, Cassirer, 
Holcomb & Lobenfeld, Comments on the Proposal of Professor John J. Flynn on 
No-Fault Monopoly, 49 A n t i t r u s t  L . J. 897 (1980); McKinney, The Case Against 
No-Conduct Monopolization, 37 W a s h . & L e e  L . R ev . 73 (1980).
130. Flynn, supra note 1, at 111-30; Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 
Analysis: Three Proposals for Reducing the Chaos, 99 A n t i t r u s t  L. J. 1593 (1980).
HeinOnline -- 13 U. Tol. L. Rev. 533 1981-1982
534 TOLEDO L A W  REVIEW [Vol. 13
defendant would be held liable in treble damages: 1) Is there a fac­
tual connection between plaintiffs injury and the defendant? 2) 
Does the legal system’s protection extend to the interest that plain­
tiff seeks to vindicate and, if some protection is afforded, what stan­
dard of care does the legal system impose on the defendant? 3) Was 
the standard of care breached by the defendant? 4) What are the 
damages?
This system of analysis avoids confusion of legal and factual 
cause and makes clearer the central issue of whether a defendant 
has violated the law or not vis-a-vis the particular plaintiff bringing 
the suit. It avoids the problem illustrated by cases like Berkey and 
CalComp—confusing questions about proof of a violation of the law 
with questions about proof of damages to a particular plaintiff 
which is claiming the violation caused it measurable antitrust dam­
age. A close reading of many current monopolization cases indicates 
that they were brought by plaintiffs who had not carefully thought 
through their case. Others present a confused mishmash of analysis 
by a court because no consistent methodology for sorting out the 
issues of violation and damages is followed by the courts in treble 
damage monopolization cases. The standards for determining what 
it is that violates the law, who may sue, which party has the burden 
of proof on what issues, which are questions of fact and questions of 
law for court and jury for trial and appellate review purposes, what 
level of proof is required to get to a jury on each issue of the case, 
and confusion of issues like causation in law with causation in fact 
occur regularly or vary greatly from case to case and court to court. 
Consistent patterns of analysis, other than that plaintiffs usually 
win or defendants usually lose in a particular court, circuit, or com­
bination of judges on a panel, are few and far between. The problem 
is particularly acute in private litigation where more than just viola­
tion of the law must be proved. It is not enough to prove the law was 
violated; a private plaintiff must also prove it is a violation causing 
the particular injury about which the particular plaintiff complains. 
The converse is also true. It is not enough to show a defendant’s 
conduct injures a plaintiff; the plaintiff must also show that its in­
jury has been caused by virtue of a violation of the antitrust laws. 
Too many recent monopolization cases have proved one-half of the 
case without proving the other or have resulted in a court confusing 
one with the other, an indication that the lawyers involved have not 
carefully thought out their case or that the courts involved have not 
kept analytically distinct the basic elements of a private cause of 
action grounded in Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Adoption of a 
duty-risk format for organizing the analysis would bring a much
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needed reform to private monopolization litigation.
C. Closer Judicial Supervision of the Litigation
A final suggested reform for monopolization litigation is that of 
the N.C.R.A.L.P. Report: active judicial management of the big 
case.131 This is being tried in the government’s AT&T case. It will be 
interesting to watch whether it makes a difference. Thus far, the 
case is moving along with relative dispatch, a dispatch relative to 
the complexity and significance of the case. Active judicial manage­
ment and supervision cannot but help to speed along the truly big 
case. What it means for lesser cases remains to be seen, but I remain 
a skeptic about whether active judicial management without lawyer 
self-discipline can accomplish much. Winning at any cost and by 
just about any means is beginning to infect the litigation of too 
many cases. The self-imposed ethical consensus of what are accept­
able tactics in the litigation process are just as important as the ex­
plicitly defined standards by ethical codes and criminal statutes. 
When those unwritten standards sink to new lows of what is consid­
ered legitimate behavior, judicial enforcement of some written ethi­
cal code will prove to be of no avail. The morass of the big case will 
continue because the principal architects of the morass will want it 
to do so and they or their clients will benefit from doing so.
IV. C onclusion
We have been living through one of the three great waves of mo­
nopolization litigation under the Sherman Act. It is similar in its 
size and scope to the pre-World War I wave and the post-World 
War II wave of significant and substantial monopolization cases.182 
It remains to be seen whether the wave has reached its zenith and is 
about to crash or whether it is a “roller” destined to keep moving on 
for a sustained period of time. In my judgment, the wave is quickly 
receding to the extent it has been kept going by the big government 
case. The current Administration is not likely to initiate significant 
new monopolization litigation or even horizontal merger cases, let 
alone vertical or conglomerate merger cases. The Administration 
even appears reluctant to keep pushing those cases that are in the 
mill and apparently wishes to devote its resources to complicating 
cases private parties choose to bring. By the time Orwell’s 1984 rolls
131. See supra note 7, at 12-13.
132. See Flynn, supra note 1, at 4-8.
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around, Fortune’s 500 may shrink to Fortune’s 50, assuming “supply 
side” economics does not wipe them all out, as a result of a policy of 
benign neglect by enforcement officials and the drive by large firms 
to merge, apparently only for the sake of doing so.
A parasitic industry of lawyers, banks, securities specialists, ac­
countants and others has grown up with a vested interest in keeping 
large mergers going. Many of the current mergers make little eco­
nomic sense and promise no observable public benefits. The only 
beneficiaries appear to be the parasites, napoleonic managements, 
and unemployed bureaucrats whose skills will be needed to create 
the vast and unwieldy new bureaucracies that will be required to 
mismanage new empires of privilege and power. It is peculiar to 
watch the Reagan Administration strenuously dismantling vast gov­
ernment bureaucracies on efficiency grounds while blessing or toler­
ating the creation of inefficient private bureaucracies because it is 
assumed they are “efficient” by the dictates of the theology by 
which the Administration lives. The clear message appears to be one 
of laissez-faire in government enforcement efforts, along with lais­
sez-faire in the other general activities in which government engages, 
with the exception of defense contractors, tax subsidies for the rich, 
pork barrel in Tennessee and subsidies for sugar and tobacco pro­
ducers from the states of politically useful legislators.
The continuation of private litigation, however, is another mat­
ter. There is still steam behind private treble damage litigation; it 
would not be surprising if wave three monopolization litigation 
keeps rolling along because of private lawyer and client “free enter­
prise” combined with the relaxation of active government enforce­
ment of section 2. We may well witness the advent of laissez-faire in 
government enforcement stimulating a resurgence in private litiga­
tion — a result I am not certain will be widely appreciated or 
warmly received in Washington circles. Washington objections not­
withstanding, however, private litigation faces the prospect of a 
growing number of hurdles. Restrictive lower court standards on the 
conduct issue and widespread confusion about the elements of the 
offense make recourse to section 2 risky at best and defense of a 
section 2 case a gamble which might not be worth taking. Judicial 
reliance on abstract economic models, the type promoted at the 
corporate financed finishing school for federal judges in Miami,133 
may result in a purely coincidental relationship between the analysis 
a court brings to a case and the reality of the case.
133. See Barbash, supra note 13.
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Any survey of recent monopolization litigation can only conclude 
that while the bottles may have changed the same old wine is in­
volved. How do we define markets, measure the presence or absence 
of monopoly power and sort out pro-competitive and anti-competi­
tive conduct by a monopolist? What values is the law designed to 
express and what goals is it meant to achieve? An exclusive reliance 
upon economic models does not seem up to the task; perhaps it is 
time we took another look at the old bottle of the common law 
process.
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